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INTERPRETING INDENTURES:
HOW DISEQUILIBRIUM ECONOMICS
AND
FINANCIAL ASSET SPECIFICITY
SUPPORT NARROW
INTERPRETATION
HOUMAN B. SHADAB*
"Economists have too long ignored the study of how firms and economic
systems actually operate in a dynamic, tumultuous environment."
-Paul Milgrom and John Roberts'
I. INTRODUCTION
The corporation is a source of both great cooperation and great
conflict. Within the market as a whole, interfirm coordination produces
goods and services that constitute the material base of civilization. Within
a single corporation, inputs are transformed and sold, yielding an income
stream that simultaneously satisfies the claims of creditors, employees, and
shareholders. Yet, at the same time, the separate claims on a corporation's
income creates potential conflicts of interest about precisely how these
claims are to be met.
* Class of 2002, University of Southern California Law School; B.A. 1998, University of
California at Berkeley. I thank Professor Eric Talley for his helpful feedback and encouragement;
Candice Choh, MaryBeth Lipp, and Adina Rosenthal for their superb editing; Mathew Ferguson for his
industrious source collection; the novelist-philosopher-social critic Ayn Rand and economist-
philosopher-historian Murray Rothbard for their lifelong intellectual inspiration; and my parents
Farrokh and Akhtar without whom nothing would be possible. All errors are my own.
1. PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, EcONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT 594
(1992).
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Bondholders are a group whose claims have been long recognized as
potentially conflicting with the interests of the corporation as a whole.
Holders of corporate bonds loan capital to corporations with the
expectation of receiving a stream of fixed payments over a contractually-
established time period. Corporate managers (who control day-to-day firm
operations), however, may take actions that benefit either themselves
and/or shareholders at the expense of bondholders.2 As we shall see, such
conduct has served as the basis for numerous legal claims brought against
corporations by their bondholders.
Over time, bondholders or their trustees have found it preferable to
negotiate for protective covenants in bond contracts (indentures) in order to
prohibit management from engaging in activities that may dilute the market
value of their bonds, increase the risk of the corporation defaulting on their
bonds, or both. The ability of protective covenants to protect the interests
of bondholders adequately has received scholarly attention, with some
scholars arguing for courts and legislators to impose extra-contractual
duties on corporations to their bondholders, 3 and others arguing against the
fairness or efficiency of such extra-contractual duties.4
This Note sheds new light on the general rights of bondholders by
developing two new economic tools for courts to use in interpreting
indentures. These tools consist of observations of economic reality: The
first properly accounts for the dynamic and uncertain nature of the market
process and the second recognizes how using financial capital tends to limit
the conduct of a corporation. Such tools offer novel explanations of the
2. See id. at 494-96; Annette Poulsen, Corporate Debt, in THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
EcoNoMIcs 558, 560-62 (David R. Henderson ed., 1993); Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner,
On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118 (1979).
3. See generally Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 BUS. LAW.
413, 456 (1986) [hereinafter McDaniel, Corporate Governance] (arguing that corporate directors
should have a fiduciary duty to protect bondholders); Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and
Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205, 313-315 (1988) (arguing, inter alia, that courts should impose a duty
of fairness on directors to bondholders); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate
Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1990) (arguing that bondholders should be provided rights
similar to those possessed by stockholders).
4. See generally Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting out of Fiduciary Duties: A
Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990) (arguing against the imposition of
mandatory duties on corporate managers); Marcel Kahan, The Qualified Case Against Mandatory
Terms in Bonds, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 565, 622 (1995) (favoring mandatory terms for indentures only if
certain institutional or empirical changes take place); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking A Corporation's
Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 647 (1996) (arguing that a corporate debtor owes only a
limited obligation of good faith to creditors); Dale B. Tauke, Should Bonds Have More Fun? A
Reexamination of the Debate over Corporate Bondholder Rights, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1 (1989)
(arguing against fiduciary duties of debtor corporations to bondholders and instead for the use of more
flexible contractual interpretation).
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current narrow approach to indenture interpretation courts take, while also
shedding light on how courts might be assisted in future decisions.
In Part II these tools are borne out. I first explain the basic ideas of
"disequilibrium economics," an economic theory based on the idea that the
economy is best understood as an ever-changing and uncertain environment
in which entrepreneurship plays a central role. Next, I develop a specificity
theory of financial capital-a theory about how money raised by a
corporation is limited in how it may be used. This is done by applying the
analysis of the specificity of physical capital (e.g., machinery, plants, raw
materials) to the specificity of financial capital. As I attempt to show, a
fundamental distinction exists between financial capital obtained from
borrowing (bond capital) and financial capital obtained from issuing stock
(equity capital). From the perspective of managerial expectations, bond
capital has a greater degree of specificity than does equity capital as the
former is compatible with fewer production plans than is the latter. As
such, the use of bond capital during the production process is in many
respects the economic equivalent of using more specific physical capital.
Part III discusses the implications of disequilibrium economics and
applies the concept of higher specificity of bond capital to guide judicial
interpretation of indentures. A bond is a contract in which the corporate-
promisor owes a specific duty to the bondholder-promisee while operating
in a business environment of perpetual change and uncertainty. Given such
an environment, I will argue that the specificity of bond-capital sufficiently
restricts managerial actions. Further, I will justify why courts have adopted
(and should adopt) a narrow approach to indenture interpretation.
Part IV concludes by way of summary.
II. DISEQUILIBRIUM ECONOMICS AND THE SPECIFICITY OF
FINANCIAL CAPITAL
As a matter of intellectual history, economists emphasizing either the
importance of disequilibrium in economic theory or the specificity (or
limited uses) of physical capital have followed the fundamental insights of
marginalism and subjectivism as developed by scholars working within the
Austrian school of economics.5 Since my specificity theory of financial
5. For a representative sample of Austrian economics, see, for example, CARL MENGER,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (James Dingwall & Bert F. Hoselitz trans., Libertarian Press, Inc. 1994)
(1871) (founding Austrian economic theory by, among other things, discovering the principle of
marginal utility and applying methodological individualism and subjectivism to economics); LUDWIG
VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS (3d ed. Henry Regnery Co. 1966) (1949)
2002]
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capital extends Austrian physical capital theory to financial capital, and
since Austrian physical capital theory is based upon disequilibrium
economics, I will first explain the relevant features of disequilibrium
economics before turning to capital theory.
A. DISEQUILIBRIUM ECONOMICS
A fundamental feature of economic reality is that it is marked by
constant change-perpetual disequilibrium-in economic phenomena. As
Ludwig von Mises stated, "[t]he market is not a place, a thing, or a
collective entity. The market is a process .... ,, As millions of
individuals interact to maximize their expected utility within an economic
system,7 prices, costs, and interest rates change; supply and demand
fluctuate; firms expand and shrink; and new technology, information, and
preferences are adopted. The dynamism of economic data through time
prevents the achievement of a general or even partial equilibrium--of
stasis-in the economy. New information leads to the adoption of different
consumption and production plans, thereby forestalling the required
balance of forces (supply and demand) for equilibrium. While the
overwhelming majority of microeconomists make heavy use of the concept
of equilibrium, 8 a descriptively accurate analysis of markets must proceed
by acknowledging the pervasiveness of disequilibrium in virtually all
aspects of the economy. 9
The dynamism of the market process in turn creates genuine
uncertainty about the future such that not only is the probability of future
[hereinafter HUMAN ACTION] (expounding the major principles of Austrian economics from the broader
study of praxeology); THE ELGAR COMPANION TO AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS (Peter J. Boettke ed., 1994)
(sampling Austrian perspectives on a wide range of methodological and substantive issues in economics
and closely related disciplines); 15 GREAT AUSTRIAN ECONOMISTS (1999) (providing personal and
intellectual biographies of fifteen eminent Austrian and paleo-Austrian economists).
6. HUMAN ACTION, supra note 5, at 257 (emphasis added).
7. Austrians employ what Korobkin and Ulen refer to as the "expected utility" version of
rational choice theory. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1062-64
(2000). See also MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE 14-17 (1993) (providing an
introductory discussion of utility maximizing behavior from an Austrian point of view).
8. For discussions and persuasive critiques of the use of the concept of equilibrium in modem
economics, see, for example, Roger W. Garrison, Austrian Economics as the Middle Ground, in
METHOD, PROCESS, AND AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 131 (Israel M. Kirzner ed., 1982); PETER LEWIN,
CAPITAL IN DISEQUILIBRIUM 13-44 (1999); FRtDtRIC E. SAUTET, AN ENTREPRENEURIAL THEORY OF
THE FIRM 7-9 (2000); TIME, UNCERTAINTY, AND DISEQUILIBRIUM (Mario J. Rizzo ed., 1979).
9. This conclusion does not preclude the usefulness of the equilibrium concept. See, e.g., JMrge
Guido Hfilsmann, A Realist Approach to Equilibrium Analysis, 3 Q. J. AuS. ECON. 3 (2000).
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outcomes unknown, but so are the actual outcomes themselves.' Not only
are economic data in constant flux, but the magnitude and direction of their
change is random and unpredictable in any short period of time."1 This is
not to imply that the economic world is characterized by complete
uncertainty or that there are no (knowable) economic laws,12 but rather,
that the economic world is beyond the scope of deterministic statistical
modeling. As a result, a fundamental economic problem inheres in
implementing successful plans in the face such uncertainty.1 3
Fortunately, economic actors are constantly predicting the future with
sufficient accuracy so as to implement their economic plans successfully.
Thus, the phenomenon of successful economic plan coordination gives rise
to the concept of entrepreneurship. 14  That is, all successful economic
action (that is, action that yields a profit) entails the employment of scarce
resources in the face of (at least some) uncertainty.15 Entrepreneurship thus
consists of employing capital in the successful prediction of economic
events. Under this view, even a salaried employee is an entrepreneur since
10. This "genuine" uncertainty is often referred to as Knightian uncertainty as developed in
FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921). See also NICHOLAS GEORGESCU-
ROEGEN, THE ENTROPY LAW AND ECONOMIC PROCESS 122 (1971), cited in OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 58 n.17 (1985) (arguing that outcomes that "involve
'novelty' cannot be described by probability distributions"); Hans-Hermann Hoppe, On Certainty and
Uncertainty, Or: How Rational Can Our Expectations Be?, 10 REV. Aus. ECON. 49 (1997); Richard
Langlois, Risk and Uncertainty, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS, supra note 5.
11. For an application of this principle in financial markets, see BURTON G. MALKIEL, A
RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE BEST AND LATEST INVESTMENT ADVICE MONEY CAN BUY
(1996) (arguing that the prices of stocks are random in the short term). But see JOHN Y. CAMPBELL,
ANDREW W. Lo & A. CRAIG MACKINLAY, THE ECONOMETRICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 27-80
(1997) (arguing that financial asset prices are to some significant degree predictable); Frank Shostak, In
Defense of Fundamental Analysis: A Critique of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, 10 REV. AUS. ECON.
27, 42-44 (1997) (arguing that asset prices are non-random and ultimately determined by
entrepreneurship).
12. For modem exponents of this view, see Ludwig Lachmann, From Mises to Shackle: An
Essay on Austrian Economics and the Kaleidic Society [1976], in EXPECTATIONS AND THE MEANING
OF INSTITUTIONS: ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS BY LUDWIG LACHMANN 229 (Don Lavoie ed., 1994); G. L. S.
SHACKLE, DECISION ORDER AND TIME IN HUMAN AFFAIRS (2d ed. 1969) (arguing that choice
introduces an element of non-distributional uncertainty into human conduct).
13. Although cast in somewhat different terms, F.A. Hayek defines the economic problem as
"the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality." F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM
AND ECONOMIC ORDER 78 (1948).
14. In deriving the concept of entrepreneurship by observing its underlying facts (i.e., plan
coordination) I am following the inductivist epistemological method of Ayn Rand as developed in AYN
RAND, INTRODUCTION TO OBJECTIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY 10-28, 40-44 (Harry Binswanger & Leonard
Peikoff eds., 2d ed. 1990).
15. If there were no uncertainty about the future, then action would be meaningless since it could
not effect an already known future. On uncertainty as a universal category of action, see HUMAN
ACTION, supra note 5, at 105-18.
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she employs human capital (having both real and opportunity costs) with
the expectation of obtaining an income stream whose payment is less than
completely certain.
Entrepreneurship is not just an important feature of the economy-
entrepreneurial profit and loss is the fundamental driving force of economic
change and growth of the market.16 While workers may be viewed trivially
as entrepreneurs, the most economically significant type of entrepreneur is,
of course, the capitalist-entrepreneur, who invests financial or physical
capital in an attempt to earn a rate of return above that of alternative
investment opportunities. In this way, entrepreneurship-the successful
"overcoming" of uncertainty, so to speak-also explains a fundamental
institution of the market economy, namely, the firm.17
As Ronald Coase defines it, a firm is a "system of relationships which
comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an
entrepreneur."'1 8 In order to implement a production plan successfully, an
entrepreneur must have control of specific capital goods during the
required production period. As Sautet explains, "[i]f the entrepreneur
cannot secure the use of the necessary inputs for the exploitation of his/her
plan, no production can take place."' 9 By placing capital goods under the
ownership of a single entity, the firm allows an entrepreneur to control the
inputs required for the implementation of a production plan. Without the
firm, there would exist enough uncertainty about the availability of capital
goods in the price-quantity combinations required to obtain a profit so as to
render production impossible. 2
0
16. See HUMAN ACTION, supra note 5, at 252-56; ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1-100 (1973) (arguing that the competitive process is driven by entrepreneurial
alertness to profit opportunities); Murray N. Rothbard, Professor H~bert on Entrepreneurship, 7 J.
LIBERTARIAN STUD. 281 (1985) (arguing that entrepreneurship requires actually committing scarce
resources in the face of uncertainty); SAUTET, supra note 8, at 55-66.
17. This entrepreneurial rationale of the firm follows the approach taken in SAUTET, supra note
8, at 55-83. For traditional accounts of the nature of the firm, see Armen A. Alchian & Susan
Woodward, The Firm Is Dead; Long Live the Firm: A Review of Oliver E. Williamson's The Economic
Institutions of Capitalism, 26 J. ECON. LIT. 65, 70 (1988); MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at
538-84.
18. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS,
EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 18-33 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991) (1937)
(emphasis added).
19. SAUTET supra note 8, at 74.
20. Under this view, firms do not arise in response to informational transaction costs since such
costs presuppose that such information already exists, whereas the uncertainty that gives rise to
entrepreneurship and firms is about information that is unknown-genuine uncertainty. On the
relationship between entrepreneurship and uncertainty, see Israel M. Kirzner, Entrepreneurship, in THE
ELGAR COMPANION TO AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 103, 108-109 (Peter J. Boettke ed., 1994).
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The scope of a firm is ultimately determined by a basic choice firm
members make with respect to obtaining financial and physical capital:
Members can either purchase capital inputs from external markets or obtain
capital inputs by transacting within the firm. With respect to physical
capital, this choice manifests itself in the traditional "make or buy"
decision.21 That is, firm members may either purchase capital goods on the
market, or they may use current resources to produce the input itself. With
respect to financial capital in a publicly held corporation, the basic choice
manifests itself in the source of capital: either through issuing bonds or by
selling shares of equity. Borrowing capital from bondholders is a market-
based transaction in that the firm buys current capital at the price of paying
future interest and principal payments to bondholders.22 On the other hand,
obtaining capital by issuing shares of stock is the financial equivalent of
organizing a transaction within a firm-the firm reorganizes its ownership
structure by giving new titles to shareholders in exchange for financial
capital. Selling shares does not constitute an external market transaction
because equity capital is not being purchased at a market-determined price.
Rather, an internal transaction takes place within the firm that produces
capital by reallocating the firm's ownership among new shareholders.
23
The dynamism of the market process necessitates firms to grow and
change in response to constantly changing economic conditions. Firms
change, not only in response to different prices and other economic data,
but also because the capabilities of firm members change. 24 In turn, the
capability of firm members depends largely on how knowledge within the
firm is acquired and transmitted.25 Entrepreneurship plays an important
role in determining a firm's capabilities because firms not only learn by
disseminating useful knowledge, but they also learn by discovering what
21. See generally Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:
A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986) (defining the decision for a
firm to make or buy in terms of the ownership rights of assets); Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford
& Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting
Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297 (1978) (arguing that the more specific the asset, the more likely firms
will tend to make rather than purchase the asset); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 82-131 (1975).
22. Most firms issue bonds in units of $1000. KENNETH M. MORRIS & VIRGINIA B. MORRIS,
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING MONEY & INVESTING 85 (1999).
23. The price of equity shares are, of course, determined by the stock market. In this case,
however, it is the investors purchasing on the market, not the firm.
24. See generally Brian J. Loasby, The Organisation of Capabilities, 35 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 139 (1998) (arguing that firms are organized in accordance with firm members' capabilities);
EDITH PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM (3d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (1959)
(arguing that the growth of firms is a process driven primarily from the capabilities of managers).
25. Cf SAUTET supra note 8, at 89-97.
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was previously unrecognized as useful.2 6 The discovery and successful
exploitation of new information and profit opportunities change the
capabilities of a firm, and in turn, shape its growth. A fundamental element
for the success of a firm, therefore, is its ability to adapt and grow in
response to unforeseen circumstances and new knowledge.
B. PHYSICAL CAPITAL
As the foregoing suggests, the proper use of capital plays a central role
in the economy and in every firm. Depending upon the context, the term
"capital" can have various meanings in law and economics. 27 At its most
general, capital is anything that is used to produce other economic goods.
Two fundamental types of capital are physical capital (or physical assets)
28
and financial capital (or financial assets).29 Goods in the former category
include factories, machinery, and computer software; goods in the latter
category include money or other paper assets, such as commercial notes.
At least one unit of both physical and financial capital is required for a firm
to produce any product. In order to maximize profits, a firm will attempt to
use every unit of capital until the value of the output produced by (or with)
that unit equals its cost.30 Taken together, the physical and financial assets
of a firm constitute its total capital structure.
31
Every business firm at any given point in time possesses a definite
quantity of capital that it uses to produce final products. While financial
capital is more or less fungible and in principle can be used to produce any
good, physical capital is not a homogeneous, interchangeable collection of
resources. Rather, as Ludwig Lachmann emphasized in his path breaking
26. See id. at 106-07.
27. For an historical overview of the controversies on the nature of capital, see Lewin, supra note
8, at 45-110.
28. Generally, an asset is "any item of use or value" to a firm. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 45
(6th ed. 1996).
29. A third type of capital is the productive skills or abilities of a person, referred to as "human
capital." See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION (3d ed. 1993) (analyzing the economic importance of
investments in education). But see GEORGE REISMAN, CAPITALISM: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS
455-56 (1998) (arguing against the very concept of "human capital").
30. Formally, a firm should use capital until MRPk = r where MRP, is the value of a unit of
capital's output and r is the rate at which the firm pays for the capital. See ROBERT H. FRANK,
MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 532-33 (2000).
31. The term "capital structure" is usually meant, however, to denote a firm's particular ratio of
debt to equity, also known as leverage. See, e.g., Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders,
13 J. CORP. L. 205 (1988). 1 am using the term "total capital structure" to clarify Lachmann's notion of
"capital structure," which is the particular arrangement of physical and financial capital of the firms in
an economy.
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1956 work Capital and Its Structure: "All [physical] capital resources are
heterogeneous. The heterogeneity which matters is here, of course, not
physical heterogeneity, but heterogeneity in use .... The real economic
significance of the heterogeneity of capital lies in the fact that each capital
good can only be used for a limited number of purposes."
32
Physical capital thus has the quality of multiple specificity-it is
capable of being used for several, albeit limited, production plans.
Financial assets, on the other hand, are generic and thus have the potential
of being used in an infinite number of production plans. 33  Money, for
example, can be used to purchase any unit of equipment.
Economic complementarity exists to the extent that two or more units
of capital can be combined to complete a production plan successfully.
34
Since physical capital can be combined in numerous ways to fulfill a given
production plan, the question of what capital combinations are most
profitable becomes of central importance to a firm. What it means to
complete a production plan "successfully" is entirely dependent on the
subjective expectations of the relevant economic actor (e.g., production
manager, financial analyst), not on any external or objective criterion.35
What constitutes economic complementarity is open-ended: at one end of
the spectrum it may require a capital combination to yield a rate of return
far above the market average; at the other, it may even include combining
capital to produce at an economic loss (since producing at a loss in the
short-run can be in the long-run interests of a firm).
The structure of physical capital within a firm changes over time in
response to an economy's ever-changing conditions. Profitable capital
combinations can increase a firm's cash balances and the market price of
its securities. Conversely, unprofitable capital combinations decrease a
firm's cash reserves and the value of its securities. 36 The specificity of
physical assets is important in this process. When a production plan fails,
firms may change their capital combinations in an attempt to produce their
outputs more efficiently. The less specific the asset (the more adaptable it
32. LUDWIG M. LACHMANN, CAPITAL AND ITS STRUCTURE 2 (Institute for Humane Studies
1978) (1956) (emphasis added).
33. Lewin makes a similar point in passing when he states: "In a sense, cash is the most
substitutable [i.e., least specific] of the company's capital assets." LEWIN, supra note 8, at 126.
34. See LACHMANN, supra note 32, at 3, 12, 54; Ludwig M. Lachmann, Complementarity and
Substitution in the Theory of Capital, in CAPITAL, EXPECTATIONS, AND THE MARKET PROCESS 197
(Walter E. Grinder ed., 1977); LEWIN, supra note 8, at 121-25. See also MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra
note 1, at 135-36 (discussing the economic importance of "cospecialized assets").
35. See LACHMANN, supra note 32, at 20-34; LEWIN, supra note 8, at 123-25.
36. See LACHMANN, supra note 32, at 95-96; LEWIN, supra note 8, at 126-27.
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is), the less a failed production plan will cost a firm, since the capital will
more easily fit into a different production structure. As firms grow, learn,
and accumulate capital, their capital structure becomes more complex and
this tends to increase the specificity of its physical capital.37
Additionally, physical asset specificity can give rise to opportunistic
behavior such as the "hold-up" problem.38 This risk is "the possibility that
transactors may violate the intent of their contractual understanding by
expropriating the quasi-rents from the specific reliance investments that
have been made by the transacting parties. 39  The more specific the
capital, the lower its value in being used for anything but its intended
purpose.40  If a buyer contracts to buy from a seller with highly specific
assets, the buyer may hold-up the seller by changing the terms of the
contract to its favor after performance begins. Given the high cost of not
using the asset as originally intended, the seller will still accept the less
favorable contract or else suffer losing the entire investment. The costs
associated with attempting to minimize hold-up risks determine significant
aspects of a firm's organization. Such attempts include entering into long-
term contracts, purposely leaving certain contractual terms unspecified, and
vertically integrating with (buying) the potentially opportunistic party.4 1
C. FINANCIAL CAPITAL
A firm can obtain financial capital either through receiving positive
cash flows by selling goods at a price higher than their cost, or through
(financial) capital markets via issuing securities.42 A security is any
instrument that gives the holder a claim on some aspect of a firm. 4 3
Securities can come in many forms, but the two fundamental ways for a
37. See LACHMANN, supra note 32, at 72-85; LEWIN supra note 8, at 130-33.
38. See, e.g., MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 136-38. Physical asset specificity is
referred to as "asset specificity" in the relevant literature, a term which I consider synonymous.
39. Benjamin Klein, Contracts and Incentives: The Role of Contract Terms in Assuring
Performance, in CONTRACT ECONOMICS 150 (Lars Werin & Hans Wijkander eds., 1992).
40. As Lewin states, "[a]n asset is specific when its opportunity cost is substantially below the
value of its current contribution to production." LEWIN, supra note 8, at 144.
41. Physical asset specificity, opportunistic behavior, and transaction costs have been extensively
analyzed. See NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM
POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 148-151 (1997); THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND
DEVELOPMENT (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991).
42. See RICHARD A. BREALY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
(2001).
43. See generally MORRIS & MORRIS, supra note 22, at 34. For the legal definition of a security,
see Securities Act of 1933 § 2(l), 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)(1) (2000); Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
§ 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(10); SEC v. H. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297 (1946). See also ALAN
R. PALMITER, SECURITIES REGULATION: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 29-52 (1998).
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firm to issue securities are to borrow money from creditors by issuing
bonds, or to sell an ownership claim in the firm by issuing equity shares
(stocks). Publicly held corporations raise the largest amounts of financial
capital in an economy, and such capital is traded through distinct markets
devoted solely to the buying and selling of securities (the "stock market").
One of the main incentives for a firm to obtain financial capital, as
opposed to just purchasing the physical capital that is required for
production, stems from the basic economic purposes of money itself.44 As
a homogeneous store of monetary value, the financial assets that a firm
obtains by issuing bonds or stocks can be used with any production plan it
undertakes, either in the present or in the future. At this level, there is no
economic distinction to be made between bond capital and equity capital.
A dollar, regardless of whether it was raised by issuing bonds or equity, is
still just a dollar.
Financial capital, moreover, performs two important functions for a
firm-the first, direct, and the second, indirect. First, financial assets serve
as a capital input into the production process and allow a firm to obtain and
use the physical capital it requires to produce its goods. Second, the market
price of securities (stocks and bonds) serves as a proxy to the firm of its
own value because stocks are claims to the assets and productivity of a firm
that are priced and traded in the external financial markets. Since
combinations of financial capital are not in and of themselves productive
(money is, after all, only a medium of exchange), they must ultimately be
combined with physical assets in order to produce goods. Thus, there
exists economic complementarity between physical and financial capital
when the financial capital used to purchase or maintain physical capital
fulfills a production plan. The second (and indirect) function of financial
assets gives rise to another relationship between the physical and financial
capital owned by a firm, as described by economist Peter Lewin:
[Financial] market evaluations of the prospects of success or failure of
the firm and its [physical] capital combinations are reflected in the
financial assets associated with the firm. The financial assets (for
example, debt and equity) form a superstructure over the [physical]
capital assets of the company and constitute its asset structure. 45
As I will show, this "superstructure" between financial and physical
capital also consists of how the source of financial capital limits the
44. On the economic role of money, see MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, WHAT HAS GOVERNMENT
DONE TO OUR MONEY? 11-54 (4th ed. 1990).
45. LEWIN, supra note 8, at 125. See also LACHMANN, supra note 32, at 86-99.
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number and type of physical capital combinations. That is, one way that
financial and physical capital are related is that using either bond or equity
capital (as opposed to cash earned from profits) limits the way a
corporation will use its physical assets.
D. THE SPECIFICITY OF FINANCIAL CAPITAL AND OF BOND CAPITAL IN
PARTICULAR
Even though financial capital is physically homogeneous and is in
principle complementary to any unit of physical capital,46 there is an
important sense in which financial capital also has the quality of
specificity: financial capital obtained from issuing bonds is limited to being
used only in ways consistent with the terms of its underlying indenture.
This specificity also plays an important role in determining how the certain
terms of bond indentures are to be interpreted. As I will argue, such capital
is limited with respect to what uses it is compatible with in a way that
financial capital obtained through positive cash flows is not. First, I will
develop a theoretical perspective on bond and equity capital where
specificity results from the legal commitments entered into by a
corporation whenever it issues stocks or bonds. Second, I will use various
empirical findings to lend support to my claim that bond capital is even
more specific than equity capital.
When a corporation borrows financial capital by issuing bonds, it
promises to pay a periodic interest payment and the principal back to the
lender (creditor). The contract establishing the terms and conditions of the
corporate lender and borrower may include covenants restricting the
conduct of the corporation in order to protect the rights of bondholders. 47
When a corporation obtains capital by selling shares of equity, on the other
hand, no contract to pay shareholders a specific amount is created.
Corporations are, however, required to act in the interests of shareholders,
as broadly established by corporate charters and court-imposed fiduciary
duties.48
The fact that both equity and bond capital can be obtained only with
corresponding legal duties to those who supply the capital (shareholders
and bondholders) means that the use of such capital is compatible only with
economic plans that do not breach such duties. For example, any use of
46. See supra note 33.
47. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; infra Part M.A.
48. A corporation's fiduciary duties to its shareholders mainly consist of a duty of loyalty and a
duty of care. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1998).
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physical capital that would entail a breach of fiduciary duties by the
corporation to shareholders is incompatible with the use of equity capital.
This limitation on the use of bond and equity capital gives them the quality
of specificity. Unlike the specificity of physical capital, which arises from
the economic compatibility of different units of physical capital, the
specificity of financial capital arises from the legal compatibility of the use
of bond or equity capital with their underlying duties.
Since bond capital carries with it a legal obligation to produce a
specific, quantitative amount of revenues in order to pay bondholders, and
equity capital imposes no such specific obligations, bond capital has a
higher degree of specificity than equity capital. The legal duties that arise
from an indenture delimit the range of conduct that a corporation may
undertake that is legally consistent with meeting those duties. Bond capital
obtains its specificity from the fact that many production plans are
inconsistent with meeting the payments to which bondholders are entitled.
Those plans that do not produce sufficient income for a corporation to meet
its bond payments (especially plans that cause a corporation to declare
bankruptcy) clearly are incompatible with the basic terms of an indenture.
For physical capital, three factors determine its specificity and the
plans with which its use is compatible: inherent technological attributes,
surrounding economic conditions, and the expectations of corporate
managers. With bond capital, the latter two factors determine its specificity
along with the terms of the indenture itself. Protective covenants also
increase the specificity of bond capital by making it less compatible with
particular uses-those uses that the covenant prohibits the company from
undertaking. For example, a protective covenant limiting the amount of
additional debt a corporation can incur may make the use of new
machinery (which can be purchased only by new debt) incompatible with
the use of such covenant-laden bond capital.
Equity capital does have the quality of specificity to the extent that its
use is incompatible with production plans that violate the duties of a
corporation to its shareholders. Since a corporation's duties to its
shareholders are very broad and compatible with a potentially unlimited
number of production plans, including bankruptcy, however, equity capital
is generally less specific than bond capital. Indeed, the fact that fiduciary
duties exist only with respect to shareholders and not bondholders suggests
that such duties are a way to constrain the activities of a corporation to
protect shareholders in a way that is not needed with respect to
bondholders. This also may explain why courts are unwilling to recognize
fiduciary duties to bondholders.
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Several empirical findings are consistent with the thesis that bond
capital has greater specificity than equity capital. Such findings relate to
the agency problems inherent in a corporation using debt financing by
issuing bonds. As is often noted, the higher a corporation's debt-to-equity
ratio, the greater are the agency costs associated with the corporation acting
on behalf of shareholders to the detriment of bondholders. 49 Vilasuso and
Minkler find that the best conditions for reducing the agency costs of debt
are the same as the best conditions for reducing transaction costs due to
physical asset specificity.5° As with physical assets, the specificity of
financial assets also should give rise to opportunistic hold-up type
behavior. For example, if a firm buys from a seller that is not performing
well and has a significant amount of bond capital (is heavily debt-laden),
the buyer might attempt to extract more favorable transaction terms,
knowing that the seller is more concerned with not defaulting on its bonds,
rather than obtaining the most favorable contract terms.51 Therefore, since
reducing a corporation's debt-equity ratio (that is its use of bond capital)
simultaneously reduces the agency costs of debt and the transaction costs
due to financial asset specificity, it seems that Vilasuso and Minkler's
findings provide indirect evidence of the specificity of bond capital. Put
negatively, if bond capital were not specific, then reducing its use would
decrease the agency costs of debt yet not decrease the transaction costs due
to its specificity. This result would contradict Vilasuso and Minkler's
finding that a reduction in one entails a reduction in the other.
If bond capital is more specific than equity capital, then corporations
should most likely employ bond capital in projects with lower variability in
their returns than projects employed with equity capital. One measure of
the variability of project returns (or project success) is the variability of a
corporation's cash flows, which directly measure the change in money
revenues proceeding from undertaking a given production plan.52  As
demonstrated by empirical findings, cash flow variability is higher in
industries where more equity capital is employed and lower in industries
where more bond capital is employed.53 This relationship between debt-
49. See McDaniel, Corporate Governance, supra note 3, at 418; Poulsen, supra note 2, at 561.
50. Jon Vilasuso & Alanson Minkler, Agency Costs, Asset Specificity, and the Capital Structure
of the Firm, 44 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 55, 55 (2001). On the transaction costs of physical capital
(asset) specificity, see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
51. Further research on holding-up leveraged firms or the methods such firms take to protect
themselves from hold-up problems might also be fruitful.
52. See LACHMANN, supra note 32, at 87 (stating that "[v]ariations in the cash balance are our
primary criterion of success or failure of [an economic] plan").
53. See Zsuzsanna Fluck, Optimal Financial Contracting: Debt Versus Outside Equity, 11 REV.
FIN. STUD. 383, 400-06 (1998).
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equity ratios and cash flow variability strongly supports the greater
specificity of bond capital over equity capital.
A final implication of bond capital having more specificity than equity
capital is exemplified by the types of firms that will choose to use bond
capital rather than equity capital in financing their production plans. That
is, what kinds of firms will tend to be more leveraged? Presumptively, the
higher a firm's rate of growth, the more varied (in terms of risk and return)
their projects will tend to be, and the less specific their assets, so they may
be less constrained to undertake diverse kinds of projects. Conversely, the
lower and more stable the growth of a firm, the more it will be able to
employ more specific assets successfully. One way of gauging the success
of the degree of financial asset specificity employed by a given firm, or
anything else that a firm does, is the firm's value. The fact that the values
of higher growth firms are positively correlated with using more equity
capital (and less bond capital), and the values of lower growth firms are
positively correlated with using more bond capital (and less equity
capital),54 suggests that the specificity of financial capital is economically
significant.
The fact that financial assets are in any sense specific may seem
counterintuitive. Financial capital is not simply money, but rather, money
to be employed in production plans with a corresponding duty to the source
of the money. As such, it is part of the overall planning that takes place
within a firm and incorporates the legal obligations to which financial
capital is tied. Having established that the specificity of financial assets is
economically significant, I will show how this result helps to explain
current judicial interpretations of indentures and how it can further assist
courts in deciding cases regarding the rights of bondholders.
III. INTERPRETING INDENTURES
A. BACKGROUND
When a corporation borrows financial capital, it issues securities
generically called bonds. The contract that establishes the rights and duties
between the bondholder 5 and the corporate debtor is called an indenture.
Although there are many types of bonds, they are unified into a single
category of security because in return for lending the corporation a certain
54. John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes, Equity Ownership and the Two Faces of Debt, 39 J.
FIN. ECON. 131, 131 (1995).
55. Also referred to as a "creditor" or "lender."
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amount of money (the "principal"), bonds give the creditor a right to be
paid periodic interest payments, and at some point in the future (at
"maturity"), the principal of their loan. Bonds that are backed only by the
general credit-worthiness of a corporation are called "debentures;"
otherwise they are "asset-backed" and secured by specific assets of the
corporation. 56 Corporations may also issue hybrid bond-equity securities
called "convertible bonds," which are bonds that can be converted into
stock at the owner's discretion. 57 Bonds are fundamentally different from
equity shares in that they constitute a claim whose payoff is independent of
the corporation's value, 58 whereas equity shares are claims whose payoff is
entirely dependent upon a corporation's value.
Over time, indentures have evolved into highly detailed yet very
standardized 59 documents whose terms are negotiated by an indenture
trustee.60 With few exceptions, all indentures must comply with the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939.61 The requirements of the Indenture Act are
sufficiently broad, however, that virtually all terms in an indenture are
governed by the private law of contract. 62  Terms of an indenture may be
amended by bondholder vote, but the Trust Indenture Act prohibits the
alteration of fundamental terms, such as interest payments and maturity,
without unanimous bondholder consent.63
The most important contractual rights of bondholders are the financial
terms and protective covenants of the indenture. 64 In addition to receiving
principal and interest payments, indentures may give the corporation or
56. For an excellent overview of bonds and their various manifestations, see MORRIS & MORRIS,
supra note 22, at 82-103.
57. See generally George W. Dent, Jr., The Role of Convertible Securities in Corporate Finance,
21 J. CORP. L. 241 (1996) (giving an overall discussion of convertible securities and the theories behind
them).
58. So long as the value of the corporation does not force it to declare bankruptcy.
59. McDaniel, Corporate Governance, supra note 3, at 423-24 (discussing the simplification of
indentures).
60. The indenture trustee is not, however, elected by bondholders. For a critique of the role of
the indenture trustee, see Yakov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade & Marcel Kahan, A New Governance
Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447, 469-85 (1999).
61. Trust Indenture Act § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd (2000).
62. See AM. BAR FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES 2 (1971) (stating that a
"fundamental characteristic of long-term debt financing [i.e., bonds] is that the rights of holders of debt
securities are largely a matter of contract").
63. Marcel Kahan, Individual and Collective Rights of Bondholders 9-11 (2000) (unpublished
draft on file with author); WILLIAM KLEIN, J. MARK RAMSEYER & STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE,
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS
862 (4th ed. 2000).
64. The following discussion of rights created by indentures follows closely that in Kahan, supra
note 63, at 5-8.
[Vol. 75:763
INTERPRETING INDENTURES
bondholders, among other things, the right to call (pay off) the bond before
maturity or give bondholders the option to have their claims not
subordinated to those of other bondholders.65 Protective covenants are
included in indentures to limit the conduct of a corporation so as to protect
the market value of the bond and to decrease the risk of default on the
bonds by the corporation.66  Such covenants include restrictions on
additional debt the corporation may incur, on the payment of dividends,
and on firm investment policy.67  Beyond their contractual rights,
bondholders also receive certain rights in virtue of their more general status
as creditors68 and securityholders. Such rights include those provided by
fraudulent conveyance law, federal securities laws, and federal bankruptcy
law.
B. THE CONTRACTUAL NATURE OF INDENTURES
The indenture is thus a contract where the corporation fills the role of
the promisor, and the bondholder that of the promisee. Like all other
contracts, the fundamental jurisprudential issue is how they should be
interpreted when their terms allow for multiple meanings. That is, is there
anything special about an indenture that merits its being interpreted
differently from standard commercial contracts? From other creditor-
debtor contracts? From other contracts governing relationships within
corporations, such as an employment contract? My answer: yes. Once the
unique nature of an indenture is understood we shall see why indentures are
(and should be) interpreted strictly, and why the imposition of mandatory
indenture terms probably is unjustified.
A contract is a legally enforceable agreement between two or more
parties.69 Since human language is inherently ambiguous and not all future
outcomes can be contracted for, contractual enforcement often requires
interpretation. How a contract is interpreted depends upon 1) the particular
type of contract in question and 2) the context within which the contractual
65. See Smith & Warner, supra note 2, at 124-25.
66. Protective covenants are also referred to as restrictive covenants, operating covenants,
business covenants, safety covenants, and negative covenants. McDaniel, Corporate Governance,
supra note 3, at 424.
67. See AM. BAR FOUND., supra note 62; Poulsen, supra note 2, at 561-62; Smith & Warner,
supra note 2, at 125-39.
68. Steven L. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 659-63 (1996) (deriving the rights of bondholders from
the general rights of creditors).
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981). But see Williamson M. Evers,
Toward a Reformulation of the Law of Contracts, 1 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 3, 10 (1977) (arguing for a
"title-transfer" as opposed to "expectations-oriented" approach to contract law).
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performance is being made-factors external to the contract itself. For
example, ambiguous terms in a boilerplate contract are given less weight
by courts than are ambiguous terms in a significantly negotiated contract;70
and whether or not ambiguous terms in a contract should be given the
meaning that both parties had in mind or the meaning that only one party
had in mind depends upon the knowledge of each party at the time of
contracting. 7
1
Interpreting an indenture should be no different. The first issue
becomes identifying the particular type of contract that is an indenture.
The most important and unique aspect of the indenture is that, in the
commercial context, it is an extremely invariable type of contract. Two
factors that determine the variability of a contract are the specificity of its
terms and the susceptibility of its terms to amendment over the course of
contractual performance. The specificity of contractual terms ranges from
being relatively open-ended ("buyer agrees to purchase whatever seller
decided to sell") to being precise quantitative amounts ("buyer agrees to
purchase exactly 14 widgets for $5 on January 14"). The amenability of
contractual terms ranges from being very amenable if a contract provides
for on-going negotiations during contractual performance, 72 to being totally
unamenable if a contract does not allow the terms to be renegotiated once
performance begins. Since -the terms in an indenture determining the
principal, interest, and maturity of a bond are denominated in quantitative
amounts, they place an indenture into the quantitative category of
contractual terms. Additionally, since the principal, interest, and maturity
of a bond can be changed only with unanimous bondholder consent (which
is to say, practically never), and other provisions such as protective
covenants require majority consent to be amended, indentures are
extremely inflexible contracts.73 Thus, given the quantitative delineation of
the core terms in an indenture and the difficulty in amending its terms,
indentures are significantly invariable contracts.
The second issue for interpretation is the context in which indentures
are used. The relevant context for interpreting indentures is determined by
two sources: the nature of corporations as they exist within the economic
system as a whole and the specificity of bond capital. As argued above, the
economic world is characterized by pervasive disequilibrium because of its
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(d) (1981).
71. Id.§ 201.
72. Id. § 34.
73. See supra note 58.
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inherent dynamism and uncertainty.74 Moreover, the smaller the unit of
economic analysis, the greater is the variability and uncertainty as to a
given economic outcome. For example, it is more certain that a given
industry will operate in a predictable and profitable manner than it is that a
particular firm will do so.75 Single corporations, as a type of firm, are the
smallest units of economic analysis (except for individuals themselves) and
a fortiori are the most dynamic and unpredictable units of the economy. In
order to operate profitably, a corporation may significantly change its
production processes, organizational structure, or even the goods it
produces by entering into different lines of business.76 An industry as a
whole, by contrast, is less likely to undergo significant changes to its
structure and is better suited to adapt to unforeseen economic changes.
The other important contextual feature of indentures-the specificity
of the capital that is obtained from bonds-arises as a result of their
contractual invariability. As shown above, the specificity of bond capital
places significant limitations on corporate conduct.77 In contractual terms,
the specificity of bond capital is important because it provides an internal,
self-enforcing contractual mechanism. Even without protective covenants,
the specificity of bond capital steers a corporation to more conservative
(less risky) production plans making it more likely to fulfill its obligations
to bondholders. Moreover, when financial capital is raised through issuing
bonds containing protective covenants, then bond capital becomes even
more specific. In such cases, some of the uses to which bond capital is
restricted are clear and objectively determinable: the protective covenants
deem certain conduct incompatible with the capital acquired by the bonds.
For example, a protective covenant prohibiting a corporation from issuing
additional bonds makes the financial capital acquired through such a bond
specific to the extent that it precludes the corporation from incurring
additional debt.
Taken together, the nature of indentures and their surrounding context
helps us to understand how courts do, and should, interpret them. The
invariability of their terms, the riskiness and uncertainty inherent in the
corporate-promisor's performance, and the self-enforcing nature of the
specificity of bond capital explain why courts interpret indentures very
narrowly.
74. See infra Part II.A.
75. Hence, the ability to lower risk by diversifying one's investment portfolio.
76. See generally MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 1-54 (describing the effects of
organization on a business's success).
77. See supra Part II.D.
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C. THE NARROW INTERPRETATION OF INDENTURES
One method of indenture interpretation explicitly followed by courts is
to strive to give indentures, which are largely made up of boilerplate
provisions, a consistent and uniform meaning. 8  The policy rationale
behind such interpretation is clear: consistent interpretation of indenture
terms promotes the efficiency of bond markets. As the court in Sharon
Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank explained, "[w]hereas participants in
the capital market can adjust their affairs according to a uniform
interpretation ... the creation of enduring uncertainties as to the meaning
of boilerplate provisions would decrease the value of all debenture issues
and greatly impair the efficient working of capital markets." 79
And just as the court used an economic rationale to justify the uniform
interpretation of indentures, I will use the economics of disequilibrium and
financial asset specificity to justify narrow interpretation.
Before examining specific cases requiring judicial interpretation of
indentures, it is important to understand at the outset why the contractual
nature of indentures leads them to their relatively narrow construction. In
the context of indentures, "narrow" or "strict" interpretation means
construing terms so as to govern as little conduct as possible. For example,
a narrow interpretation of protective covenants restricting a corporation's
investment policy would construe them to limit the number of actions to be
considered investments.
As scholars have convincingly demonstrated, much of the common
law can be understood as an attempt by courts to produce economically
efficient decisions-to maximize the sum total wealth of the parties
involved to a dispute. 80  With the foregoing legal and economic
considerations in mind, the same can be said about cases involving the
narrow interpretation of indentures.
First, the less variable a contract, the more efficient it is to interpret its
terms strictly. Contractual inflexibility is an ex ante attempt by the relevant
parties to secure a very specific relationship to one another. In the case of
indentures, the corporate promisor issues bonds consistent with its internal
78. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir. 1982);
Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 570 F. Supp. 1529, 1540-1541 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
79. Sharon Steel Corp., 691 F.2d at 1048.
80. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998) (providing
microeconomic analysis of virtually all aspects of American law); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN,
LAW AND ECONOMICS (3d ed. 1999) (providing a textbook account of the wide range of issues and
views in law and economics).
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cost-benefit calculations, and bondholders purchase bonds according to
their investment preferences. Broad construction of indenture terms would
upset the delicate calculations made by issuers and investors. By
introducing uncertainty as to the legal meaning of indenture terms, the
actual value of bonds as securities would be less predictable and lead to
less accurate, and hence, less efficient issuance and investment decisions.
Second, narrow interpretation of indentures is best suited for the
entrepreneurship required in a successful corporation. Strictly interpreting
contracts is a form of contractual incompleteness. The more narrowly the
terms of an indenture that limit the conduct of the corporate-debtor are
interpreted, the greater discretion the corporation will have to act. Since
contractual incompleteness is a response to uncertainty about future states
of the world,81 and since entrepreneurship arises in response to similar
uncertainty about the future,82 such incompleteness is conducive to
entrepreneurial behavior, and therefore, to wealth creation. On the other
hand, strictly interpreting indenture terms may give too much discretion to
corporations to engage in conduct that lowers a corporation's value at the
expense of bondholders, which would be both inefficient and inequitable.
Contracts, however, should prima facie be interpreted narrowly if they
contain a self-enforcing mechanism that sufficiently constrains the
opportunism of the promisor. A self-enforcing mechanism naturally limits
the opportunistic conduct of the parties to a contract, thereby making broad
interpretation of the terms defining duties to either side unnecessary. As
shown above, the specificity of bond capital serves such a self-enforcing
role by limiting the conduct of corporations with respect to bondholders.
Of course, how the terms of an indenture are interpreted will
determine the specificity of the bond capital they are used to obtain,
thereby subjecting my claim that indentures contain a self-enforcing
mechanism to the charge of circularity. This criticism fails for two reasons.
First and foremost, strict indenture interpretation, in the sense of narrowly
interpreting what conduct violates the terms of the indenture by the
corporation, actually makes bond capital less specific because the narrower
interpretation makes the bond capital compatible with more uses, not
fewer. Second, even the most variable type of indenture-a bond with no
protective covenants and a variable interest rate-still requires a
corporation to produce enough revenues to be able to pay bondholders.
81. See MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 4, at 151-53 (stating that "[uncertainty] will often
manifest itself in intentional contractual gaps").
82. See supra Part II.A.
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Thus, bond capital necessarily has a degree of specificity over and above
that of equity capital, which only increases with protective covenants. The
most significant weakness in the idea that the self-enforcing nature of bond
capital justifies a prima facie narrow reading of indentures is whether or
not the self-enforcing nature of indentures is sufficiently self-enforcing so
as to justify such a canon of interpretation. 83
D. CASES INTERPRETING INDENTURES
1. Cases Interpreting Express Terms
A survey of the major cases requiring courts to interpret indentures
reveals a strong disposition towards interpreting their terms narrowly,
making use of the ideas and implications of economic disequilibrium, bond
capital specificity, or both. In Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan
Bank,84 the issue was whether UV Industries' ("UV") sale of fifty-one
percent of its assets to Sharon Steel (as part of the final stage of liquidating
all of their assets) required UV to pay off their existing bonds, or whether
Sharon Steel could takeover UV's debt. Resolution of the issue required
the court to interpret the "successor obligor" clause in the indenture, which
would not allow UV to assign its debt to Sharon Steel unless it was part of
a transaction involving the sale of "all or substantially all of [UV's] assets."
The two competing interpretations of "all or substantially all assets"
revolved around whether or not the proceeds from earlier sales of UV's
assets (the other forty-nine percent) as part of a predetermined plan of
piecemeal liquidation should be included in the "all or substantially all"
determination. The court interpreted the successor obligor clause to
include proceeds from earlier asset sales, thereby requiring that all or
substantially all of the UV's assets would have to be sold to a single
purchaser in order to be able to assign their debt to Sharon Steel.
Although the court explicitly based its decision on fairness to
creditors85 and a form of wealth maximization, 86 its narrow interpretive
decision also incorporated disequilibrium economics and the specificity of
83. Quantitative research as to how bond use restricts corporate conduct in general, and as to the
restrictive properties of covenants in particular, would be extremely useful.
84. 691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982).
85. "Accepting [the alternate interpretive] position ... would severely impair the interests of
lenders .... " Sharon Steel Corp., 691 F.2d at 1051.
86. "An interpretation which sacrifices a major interest of one of the parties while furthering only
a marginal interest of the other should be rejected [i.e., not Kaldor-Hicks efficient] in favor of an
interpretation which sacrifices marginal interests of both parties in order to protect their major
concerns." Id.
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bond capital. First, the court's decision to include all sales within a
predetermined liquidation plan in the "all or substantially all"
determination was a narrow reading of the indenture in that it interpreted
the "sale" to begin when the firm first begins to liquidate; it did not
interpret a distinct "sale" to begin with every separate transaction that was
part of an overall liquidation plan. The dynamism and uncertainty of the
market process was taken into account when the court recognized that a
liquidation plan can take place over time with several separate transactions
being part of a single firm's liquidation. As such, the court argued that a
firm may use a liquidation to take advantage of ever-changing interest rates
on bonds, reflecting its understanding of the constant disequilibrium of
economic reality.87  Additionally, Sharon Steel's purchase of UV's cash
(subject to UV's debt obligations) for less than its face value88 reflects the
fact that the court did not consider the units of cash to be homogeneous and
interchangeable. Rather, the court considered UV's bond capital to be
specific-to be tied to UV's debt obligations-and therefore lower in value
than the less specific financial capital used by Sharon Steel to buy UV.
In Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., the court
explicitly based its decision on the narrower of two possible interpretations
of the relevant indenture terms in question.89  Archer Daniels Midland
Company ("ADM") had redeemed $125 million of debentures that were
paying an interest rate of 16.08%. Morgan Stanley sued, claiming that this
redemption violated a provision of the indenture stating that ADM "may
not redeem any of the Debentures pursuant to... the proceeds, or in
anticipation, of the issuance of any indebtedness for money
borrowed ... if... the interest cost ... shall be less than 16.08% per
annum."90 Although ADM subsequently did borrow money for less than
16.08%, it also issued common stock and used those proceeds to redeem
the debentures. The plaintiff argued for a broad reading of the term
"proceeds" to include the funds ADM gained from issuing stock, claiming
that in light of also raising bond capital for less than 16.08%, using the
equity capital to redeem the bonds is "an irrelevant 'juggling of funds' used
to circumvent" the protections of the indenture. 9 1
87. "Such a transaction diminishes the protection for lenders in order to facilitate deals with little
functional significance other than substituting a new debtor in order to profit on a debenture's low
interest rate." Id. A court unduly focused on the equilibrium and efficiency of capital markets may not
understand the importance of this type commercial practice.
88. Id. at 1046.
89. 570 F. Supp. 1529, 1541 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
90. Id. at 1531.
91. Id. at 1532.
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The court rejected Morgan Stanley's interpretation, opting for a
narrow interpretation of what constitutes the use of "proceeds" that would
violate the indenture agreement. The court ultimately interpreted the term
"proceeds" to include only funds gained directly or indirectly from issuing
debt at or below 16.08% and not funds gained from a common stock
offering. 92 In doing so, the court relied on the idea of financial asset
specificity-refusing to consider as indistinguishable economically what is
indistinguishable physically, namely, financial capital. That is, it
considered ADM's bond capital distinct from its equity capital. In Morgan
Stanley, therefore, the court's narrow interpretation of indenture terms was
based upon the recognition of financial asset specificity insofar as the
indenture in question limited the use of bond capital borrowed below
16.08% as incompatible with debt redemption. In rejecting the plaintiffs
argument that ADM's conduct was a mere "juggling of funds," the court
was implicitly rejecting the notion that all financial capital is homogenous,
interchangeable, and unspecific.
The Morgan Stanley court's interpretation of "proceeds" also
promotes economic efficiency: it allows a corporation to redeem its bonds
and borrow at a lower interest rate only when doing so transfers wealth
from less productive to more productive uses. The indenture provision
after Morgan Stanley requires a corporation to redeem bonds by using
financial capital gained through either an increase in cash flows or from
issuing stock. Since such activities reflect value-creation by a corporation
(or at least potentially, in the case of issuing new stock), using those funds
to redeem bonds and simultaneously borrowing new capital at a lower
interest rate results in a net increase in wealth since such productive
economic activities will be able to be financed at a lower cost. On the
other hand, redeeming bonds with capital raised at a lower rate distributes
capital between parties but not necessarily in an efficient manner.
2. Cases Interpreting the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Courts have often been called upon to decide what the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing93 ("ICGFFD") means within the
context of an indenture, and whether one of the parties violated it. As a
matter of first principle, whenever a court determines what the ICGFFD
requires of a party to a contract, it always implies only the narrowest of
92. Id. at 1535-36.
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). The origin of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing is found in Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 85
(App. Div. 1933).
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duties as being required. Courts repeatedly have stated that ICGFFD gives
a party only the rights it bargained for during contract formation and
absolutely no additional substantive rights.94 As we will see, courts use
disequilibrium economics and financial asset specificity to arrive at such a
method of interpretation in the context of indentures.
One of the most important cases addressing the rights and duties
arising under an indenture involved one of the largest leveraged buyouts
(LBO) in American corporate history, namely, the $24 billion buyout of
RJR Nabisco's (RJR) shareholders by their own management. The buyout
left RJR with $19 billion of new debt, causing the value of its existing
bonds to fall dramatically. Metropolitan Life Insurance ("MetLife"),
holding millions in RJR bonds, sued RJR claiming that by issuing new debt
for the LBO, RJR misappropriated the value of their bonds, thereby
breaching an ICGFFD.
At issue in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.95
was whether the indenture governing MetLife's bonds contained an implied
covenant prohibiting conduct that greatly reduced the value of their bonds.
The court decided in favor of the defendant-RJR, reasoning that the LBO
did not deprive MetLife of a bargained-for benefit of agreement, since the
indenture did not specify that MetLife was entitled to a particular market
value of the bond. According to the court, the role of the ICGFFD was
very narrow: it was only to give parties rights already established in the
indenture and "[could not] give the holders of Debentures any rights
inconsistent with those set out in the Indenture. '96
The court justified its refusal to add any substantive rights to the
indenture-its narrow interpretation-by applying insights consistent with
disequilibrium economics. The court realized the economic importance of
allowing companies to conduct their business free from limitations on their
conduct, especially non-bargained-for limitations.97 The dynamism of the
economic world may require companies to undergo an LBO not
contemplated in the minds of bondholders when they purchase bonds, and
94. See, e.g., CIBC Bank & Trust Co. v. Banco Cent. do Brasil, 886 F. Supp. 1105, 1115-16
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying plaintiffs claim that the ICGFFD allows an acceleration of its loan);
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 976, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Nor can
a court imply a covenant to supply additional terms for which the parties did not bargain.").
95. 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). For an extensive analysis of the case, see Nancy W.
Graml, Bondholder Rights in Leveraged Buyouts in the Aftermath of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
RJR Nabisco, Inc., 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 1 (1991).
96. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. at 1517 (quoting Gardner & Florence Call Cowles
Found. v. Empire Inc., 589 F. Supp. 669, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
97. Id. at 1520.
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the court went so far as to suggest that the market price of the bond was
discounted for such a possibility.98 Recognition of the need for such
dramatic changes in a corporation's capital structure is implied by the
disequilibrium approach to economics.
Katz v. Oak Industries99 also relied upon ideas of financial asset
specificity, albeit indirectly, in interpreting the ICGFFD as it applied to an
indenture. The issue was whether or not an offer made by Oak Industries
to its bondholders violated an ICGFFD. The offer involved redeeming Oak
Industries bonds for a cash payment certificate to bondholders in exchange
for bondholder consent to amendments in the indenture removing
significant protections for long-term bondholders.' 00 Bondholders were
faced with a choice of either exchanging their bonds and consenting to the
amendments or keeping Oak Industries bonds without their former
protective covenants. The plaintiff-bondholder Katz considered such an
exchange-offer "coercive" and therefore in violation of an implied
covenant by Oak Industries to not induce bondholders to agree to such
amendments.l10
The court in Katz rejected the plaintiff's claims, arguing that such an
exchange offer was not prohibited by the indenture and therefore not in
violation of an ICGFFD. Financial asset specificity played a role in the
court's decision insofar as it realized that given its precarious financial
position, 0 2 Oak Industries needed to become more flexible and that
removing protective covenants from its indenture was a way to accomplish
this, even though it came at the price of offering its bondholders a premium
on the value of their bonds.103 Although Oak Industries still retained
financial capital after the exchange-offer in question, the lack of protective
covenants would decrease the specificity of its financial capital and
therefore give it more latitude for entrepreneurship to flourish. The
removal of protective covenants therefore played an important
entrepreneurial role in the firm by freeing it up to take productive action,
which at the time of amendment was unknowable. Additionally, the
court's strict application of the ICGFFD in Katz promoted efficiency. The
premium made bondholders who accepted the exchange better off. The
98. Id.
99. 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
100. id. at 877.
101. Id. at 878.
102. The court stated that "[e]ven a casual review of Oak's financial results over the last several
years shows it unmistakably to be a company in deep trouble." Id. at 875.
103. Id. at 877 (recognizing that Oak Industries is paying its bondholders a premium over the
market price).
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removal of covenants made the company better off by giving it more
flexibility, and the only cost was the relatively small cost of decreasing the
value of the bonds for those who did not accept the exchange-offer from its
already low state to an even lower one.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts make heavy use of economics in their jurisprudence. They
may not, however, have a complete or explicit understanding of the
economics underlying their decisions. It is the task of the legal-economist
to make explicit what courts may understand only implicitly or not at all.
This can help us not only to understand the law as it is, but also provide a
basis for making sounder judgments based upon a more accurate
understanding of economic reality.
In this paper, I sought to point out features of economic reality that are
often underemphasized (disequilibrium economics) or hitherto unknown
(financial asset specificity) in order to analyze and guide courts in their
decisions involving the interpretation of indentures. As we have seen, the
dynamic and uncertain nature of the economic world (along with the role
entrepreneurship plays in such a world) and the varying degrees of
financial asset specificity help explain how courts interpret indentures and
why such interpretations are efficient. Furthermore, they can help guide
courts in future cases where similar issues arise. Such ideas also can be
used to critique decisions that overemphasize the role of equilibrium in
understanding corporate behavior, unduly treat different units of financial
capital as completely interchangeable, or both.
Coming full circle, we can conclude that since narrow indenture
interpretation allows corporate entrepreneurs to use capital legally in more
numerous and diverse ways than would broad interpretation, narrow
interpretation promotes entrepreneurship, which results ultimately in
increased economic activity and growth.
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